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Has Dulles Been Overruled by "Us" on Summit Talks?

The Greeks had a mythical creature, the centaur, half man, half horse. We seem to be governed in Washington by a similar composite, half President, half press agent. It has often been impossible for those who cover the White House to determine just where Mr. Eisenhower ended and Mr. Hagerty began. That widely reported remark of Mr. Hagerty to the reporter in Chicago who thought the President had a nose-bleed, "Oh, you thought it was *us*," was revealing. Mr. Eisenhower and his press representative have become an "us" —except perhaps for Sherman Adams there is probably no one closer to the President.

Against this background, Mr. Hagerty's slip in his CBS interview last Sunday has injected a new note of hope into the prospects of a summit meeting. The Eisenhower letter to Bulganin pictured a summit meeting like a gathering of constitutional monarchs to fix their royal seals on agreements arrived at by their Ministers. "It would be essential that prior to such a meeting," the letter said, "these complex matters should be worked on in advance through diplomatic channels and by our Foreign Ministers so that the issues can be presented in form suitable for our decisions. . . ."

Not How It's Understood by "Us"

The drafting of the letter was in the hands of the State Department. The procedure indicated would leave the decisions in the hands of Mr. Dulles and the rubber stamp in those of Mr. Eisenhower. But apparently this is not how it is understood by "us." For when Mr. Hagerty was asked about the preconditions for a summit meeting, he replied "we would merely like to know what we would like to discuss." His attempt later to explain away the discrepancy made it sharper. He said the President was ready to meet with Krushchev and Allied leaders "if they do one thing and fairly simple; if we have starts of diplomatic negotiations and then have a foreign ministers' meeting to do one very simple thing, to agree on what we can discuss." This would leave only the agenda in the hands of Mr. Dulles.

A recent press conference revealed that the President was not familiar with the final draft of the letter he signed to Bulganin. Apparently Mr. Hagerty didn't take time to read it too closely, either. The difference between the two views is considerable because it is the widely accepted view here and abroad that if the reins are left in the hands of Mr. Dulles, there will be no agreements, but that if they are in the hands of Mr. Eisenhower, some start toward a relaxation of tension is possible.

The widespread notion that it would be foolish to hold a summit meeting unless sure of success in advance encloses several fallacies. How can one ever be sure in a real bargaining session that there will be agreement? It is only at a conference summoned to accept the unconditional surrender of a defeated foe—as at Versailles—that one may be "sure of an agreement" in advance. What Mr. Dulles really wants is assurance in advance that the Russians will accept his terms.

A Get-Together Need Not Be Formal

Nor need an inconclusive summit meeting be a disaster. Few are foolish enough to think the complex issues between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. can be settled so quickly. It is possible to limit a session to the easier issues. It is possible to announce in advance that the purpose is for the leaders of the great nations—Eisenhower, Krushchev, Nehru, and Macmillan—to get to know each other better, as a token of good will, an informal exploration of possibilities for negotiation, a symbol of relaxed tension. It is only those who fear any relaxation of tension who fight against such a meeting. If there is to be a meeting, they prefer one so loaded with difficult questions as to make failure inescapable. They would then have demonstrated "good faith" and could step up the arms race.

Ready for Controls in That Atom Free Zone

In his speech at Minsk, Mr. Krushchev noted that the French reply to the Bulganin note, unlike the U. S., made a summit meeting contingent on a foreign ministers' meeting "to define the program of a possible summit conference, making the reservation that the foreign ministers would not be competent to discuss the question in substance." If questions of substance are left to Mr. Dulles, there will be no agreement. This is a view as widely held in allied nations as among those on the other side. The Minsk speech has not been printed here, though radio transcripts are available. These show it more hopeful than the press reports would indicate. An important point is that Mr. Krushchev in discussing the Rapacki proposal for an atom free zone said the Soviet Union "is ready to examine this proposal and to accept the establishment of the necessary controls."

"It goes without saying," Mr. Krushchev said of the Eisenhower outer space proposal, "that we cannot deny the importance of the question of control over the use of cosmic space. But this question must be examined as part of the general disarmament problem, including the question of a ban on atom and hydrogen arms." He asked a halt on testing and the elimination of bases threatening the U. S. S. R. Can one honestly deny that if the roles were reversed, we would say the same? Would there not be value in a face-to-face meeting at which the heads of the great powers and the great neutrals could discuss such questions informally?

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Is This The Kind of "Disengagement" the Administration Is Planning to Offer?

Little Noticed "Maverick" Speech on Foreign Policy May Be Clue to Ike's Plans

A group of Democratic mavericks in the House led by Henry Reuss of Wisconsin last Monday staged a small scale uprising against bi-partisan rigidity in foreign policy. We provide two glimpses of the debate and the heart of Congressman Reuss's little noticed speech because this was the first voice in Congress for any kind of disengagement, because it is well to notice how weakly inconsistent this "rebellion" is, and because he believes that the Eisenhower administration, too, has a similar kind of "disengagement" in mind. The Russians may regard the idea of "swopping" a free East Europe for a reunited Germany in NATO subject only to some arms restrictions as a gold brick, but here it is:

"At the NATO conference last December, the Administration offered our European allies a much expanded shopping list of American secrets, missiles and even nuclear weapons . . . Adequate ground strength is necessary in order to constitute a real deterrent to Russian aggression.

"Necessary though it may be to share our atomic secrets and weapons with our allies, without adequate precautions such a move will have two fateful consequences. Still another step away from conventional weapons increases the chances that any war at all in Europe will be a nuclear war. The yawning chasm that divides Europe will therefore become deeper. The goal of relaxing the tensions between East and West will be pushed even further out of reach. Secondly, placing the atomic weapon in the hands of more countries increases the number of those who can eventually trigger the atomic war we seek to avoid.

Arm and Negotiate

"Because the proposal to share atomic secrets and weapons marks a great divide, it must be considered not in isolation but in the context of the whole of our foreign and military policy. As we rush onward with the arms race, we must try equally to relax the tensions in Europe which make the arms race necessary. . . .

"I believe that such an alternative possibility lies in the disengagement of Soviet and NATO troops which now confront each other from opposite sides of the Iron Curtain through the heart of Europe. . . . If accepted by the Russians, an offer to withdraw troops and create a demilitarized zone between the Rhine and Russia would greatly increase the chances of peace by widening the area where a mistake could be made without the catastrophe of an all-out nuclear war. . . . making some such disengagement proposal, even though the Russians reject it, is, I believe, necessary if the NATO aliance is to go forward toward rearmament with any kind of unity. . . .

"Such a disengagement differs, for example, from the stimulating proposals recently made by Mr. George F. Kennan. He talks of the withdrawal of British and U. S. armed forces from the continent of Europe, and the separation of Germany from NATO, in consideration of a Russian troop withdrawal.

"I believe, on the contrary, that our forces are needed on the continent, particularly in France and the low countries, to thicken the western European defense on the ground, and as a pledge of our solidarity with our NATO allies. I also believe there is nothing inconsistent in a reunited Germany, with a self-imposed limitation on its armed forces, remaining a member of NATO. . . .

"In his letter this month to Premier Bulganin, President Eisenhower has apparently overruled Mr. Dulles and has offered in essence the above proposal. After stressing the need for reunification of Germany by free elections, and for self-government for the countries of Eastern Europe, the President said:

" 'The United States is prepared, along with others, to negotiate specific arrangements regarding force levels and deployments and broad treaty undertakings, not merely against aggression but assuring positive reaction should aggression occur in Europe.' . . .

'If these words mean anything, and I hope that they do, they mean that the United States will urge its NATO allies, including West Germany, to prepare with us a Western position regarding the demilitarization of Middle Europe as a means to reunify Germany and to bring freedom to the enslaved nations."

Prediction

"I say that ten years from now, if we continue at our present rate of spending for arms, we can look back, see what we have spent in the last ten years, yet we will have less defense, security, and more threat of war than we have now."

—Mr. Blatnik (D. Minn.), in the House, Jan. 27.

How Baghdad Pact Aid Unleashes An Arms Race in the Impoverished Middle East

Mr. McGOVERN (D., S. Dak.). Has it not been true that in some cases the military assistance we have sent to the northern tier of states, to members of the Baghdad Pact, has actually caused some other potential friends in the world to take funds away from economic and technical development and allocate them to military weapons . . . in order to counter some of the military aid given to their neighbors?

Mr. ROOSEVELT (D., Cal.). I thank the gentleman and agree with him. I can cite one specific instance, that of Israel where she feels because of military aid given to her neighbors . . . that she has to use an unwarranted proportion of her resources to build up her military strength. . . .

Mr. McGOVERN. Chester Bowles, former Ambassador to India, has reported that American military aid sent to Pakistan in 1956 prompted the Government of India to withdraw $100 million from its second 5-year plan and allocate it to military orders with the French and the British. . . .

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I come back to what I said earlier, imposition of a real arms embargo in the Middle East would enable those countries that have so much to do for the basic welfare of their people, to spend their time, their money and their efforts working for the improvement of the people in the area. Rather too often unfortunately this military buildup, in effect, only serves to keep a particular ruling party in power and to suppress the great majority of the people.

—House of Representatives, Jan. 27.

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British Ahead of Us, Russians May Be, in Search for This Cheap Ultimate Fuel

Thermonuclear Fission Could Be America's Answer to Sputnik's Challenge

There is no such thing as an ultimate weapon; there's none that won't be obsolete soon after it comes off the assembly line. But controlled thermonuclear fusion holds out the promise of being an ultimate fuel. The process belatedly unveiled here and in London in synchronized Anglo-American press conferences last week-end could be America's answer to Sputnik—as sensational as space travel and more important to mankind if the British or Russians don't beat us to it.

The possibilities were indicated in an article on Fusion Power in *Scientific American* for December. The deuterium which could be "fused" in one gallon of water has the energy equivalent of 350 gallons of gasoline. The oceans contain enough of this fuel to take care of mankind's needs for billions of years (whereas uranium may be exhausted in a century). The cost of extracting deuterium from water is low enough to make it less than one percent as expensive as coal. Best of all: fusion produces none of the radioactive wastes disposal of which represents one of the main health headaches and cost obstacles to the use of atomic fission for power. (Where fission "splits" atoms, fusion "fuses" them).

Still A Long Way Off

Power through fusion is still a long way off. The problems to be solved involve temperatures so high and densities so infinitesimally slight as to be fantastic enough for science fiction—and to lure some of the brightest young minds around us into physics. A "crash program" for thermonuclear fusion which succeeded would restore American prestige in a peaceful field and put all mankind in our debt.

But there was little sign here that Admiral Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission possessed either the magnanimity or the imagination to sell the U. S. such a project. Though the Admiral boasted that this year we would be spending about 30 times the amount spent in 1953, he did not give the figures. That year we spent $800,000. This year we will spend $23,000,000. This is chicken feed beside the seven to eight *billions* we are preparing to spend on that new "ultimate weapon," the anti-missile missile.

Where "Private Enterprise" Hurts

Thermonuclear fusion is a field in which we may well fall behind other countries (not just the Soviet Union) which do not share our shibboleths about "private enterprise." In this field "private enterprise" is a euphemism for huge monopolistic concerns in electric power and oil. They are none too enthusiastic about atomic fission; even less in a hurry about atomic fusion. Admiral Strauss has been their faithful watchdog on the AEC.

Add the Admiral's fixation about secrecy, and the stage was set for leisurely progress toward the controlled thermonuclear fusion goal. Hardly two years have passed since the Atomic Energy Commission began to allow access to information about thermonuclear fusion even "to U. S. citizens holding permits for access to restricted data." (See P. 54, Vol. 1, of the report made Jan. 31, 1956, by the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy).

Then a Russian scientist named Kurchatov turned up in England with Krushchev and Bulganin in April, 1956, and disclosed how many of our carefully guarded secrets in this field were already known to (and surpassed by) the Russians. The Kurchatov address at Harwell, Britain's main atomic installation, indicated that the Russians were ahead in the race and had succeeded in obtaining temperatures of one million degrees in thermonuclear experiments (though not yet in achieving fusion). Later that year the U. S. and the United Kingdom finally signed an agreement they had long been negotiating to exchange data in this field.

It Took Pressure from Britain

"Despite repeated denials by officials of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, it is pretty clear that scientific papers would not have been released at this time [on controlled thermonuclear fusion] but for the pressure applied by United Kingdom scientific and political sources."

—Nuclear Fusion: It Works—in the Lab, Business Week, Jan. 25, 1958.

Five Weeks Before Sputnik

Strauss used the agreement to prevent the British from making a unilateral announcement after their scientists at Harwell last August 30 produced what they believe to be the first controlled thermonuclear reaction. That was five weeks before Sputnik and could have been a feather in the West's cap. The story was leaked September 9 in the highly respected *Financial Times* of London. But the effect was not the same as an official announcement and led only to ill feeling between the U. S. and Britain where it is felt that Strauss fumbled what could have been a first rate piece of public relations because it would have precipitated Congressional criticism here of the AEC's lag behind the British.

Where We Lag

A careful reading of the official documents shows (1) that the U. S. did not duplicate the British experiment until December and (2) that we still lag behind them in the time of the observed reaction. They produced a reaction lasting thousands of a second; ours (like those reported by Kurchatov) were only to be measured in millionths of a second. This, rather than the temperature achieved (we reached six million degrees where the British only reached five), may be the key to the relative success of the experiments.

Next Monday February 10 a subcommittee of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Commission will open hearings on basic research. These will re-air old charges that the secrecy which has surrounded this non-military project held back American development and current fears here that the Russians may be ahead. Kurchatov spoke of experiments which had taken place as early as 1952. ("Soviet May Lead in Fusion Power" said a *New York Times* Jan. 26 headline over a story by Harry Schwartz). It would be foolish to assume that the Russians have been marking time. The temperature they achieved five years ago was much less than ours, but the time of the reaction was about the same.

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Miscellany: New Reason for Secrecy and A Reported Krushchev Apology for Anti-Semitism

Better Education: Maybe It Ought to Start at the Cabinet Level

According to a story by Warren Unna in the *Washington Post* (Jan. 23), when CIA Director Allen W. Dulles complained at a recent National Security Council meeting that policy makers weren't reading his intelligence reports, the President retorted that CIA reports were too hard to read. He is supposed to have said that if Mr. Dulles would brighten the reports with maps and red arrows, make them briefer and furnish headline summaries, the President would "order the Administration's top 25 or 30 policy makers to read them daily." Maybe, in discussing education, we have been putting too much stress on science and mathematics in the high schools. Maybe we had better start further down and higher up—with remedial reading courses for Cabinet members.

The best comment we have seen on the President's lopsided and inadequate education program, was made by Congressman Frank Thompson, Jr. (D., N. J.). "We have today seen," he told the House, "a message go to the Congress on education—100 percent for science, mathematics, but nothing for the humanities. We could achieve technological superiority which is greater than anyone ever imagined, and still, if we do not have people educated to understand human beings, it would be an empty victory. Suppose, for instance, some Soviet biologist comes forward next month with a discovery in biology as startling as was the Sputnik breakthrough. Would we then have a message asking us to educate 40,000 biologists in the next few years?"

Another Reason for Secrecy: When Congressman Reuss in the foreign policy speech we cited on page two complained that there was too much secrecy about foreign military aid, Congressman Vorys (R., Ohio) rose to defend the Administration by saying one of the reasons for the secrecy is the jealousy between our allies, "If County A knows that Country B is getting more jets than Country A, we are in a hot diplomatic situation. . . ."

Apology for Anti-Semitism: Wm. Zukerman's *Jewish Newsletter* (Jan. 27) reports that the respected London *Jewish Chronicle* (Jan. 10) published a story that Krushchev singled out Roman Zambrowski, the only remaining Jew on the Polish Politbureau, at a Moscow meeting and publicly apologized "for my behavior two years ago in Warsaw" when he opposed Zambrowski's election to the Politbureau by saying there were "too many Abramovitches" in the Polish government.

One The Press Missed

None of the newspapers seem to have noticed that the retiring Soviet Ambassador, Zarubin, also paid a farewell call (which extended into quite a lengthy chat) with Harold Stassen, the President's disarmament adviser and Washington's otherwise forgotten man. The visit was regarded as a mark of Soviet confidence in Stassen's sincerity as an arms negotiator.

Propaganda War Item: An Athens dispatch in *The Times* of London (Jan. 21) throws new light on that recent press and radio rumor about Russian missile bases in Bulgaria and Albania. *The Times* man reported that Moscow had threatened economic sanctions against Greece if it accepted NATO missile and atom bases. "To counteract the effects of the Soviet warnings on the Greek parliament and public opinion," the dispatch from Athens continued, "Greek military sources were reported in the Greek press today to have revealed that the Soviet Union has been building five bases for guided missiles and nuclear weapons in Bulgaria and two in Albania."

If They Would Only Keep Their Freedom Theoretical: "Some Americans," the *Wall Street Journal* reported (Jan. 28) from Venezuela, "fear the taste of political freedom now being savored for the first time in many years may be translated into tougher union demands." . . . In Venezuela, as in Hungary, the first victims of the uprising, when workers and students rose against the dictatorship, were the secret police. Apparently, a police state is a police state, whether run by a Communist bureaucracy or a monopoly capitalist tool like Jimenez: the same terror, the same abuses, the same resentments, and the same lynchings of the hated plainclothesmen when the prisons are opened. . . . So far the Venezuelan revolution, in the shadow of the U. S., is faring better than did Hungary, in the shadow of the USSR. . . . But we're waiting to see whether a Red menace will suddenly be discovered there by our oil companies. . . .

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